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Abstract
We consider extensive form win-lose games over a complete binary-tree of
depth n where players act in an alternating manner. We study arguably the
simplest random structure of payoffs over such games where 0/1 payoffs in the
leafs are drawn according to an i.i.d. Bernoulli distribution with probability p.
Whenever p differs from the golden ratio, asymptotically as n→∞, the winner
of the game is determined. In the case where p equals the golden ratio, we call
such a random game a golden game. In golden games the winner is the player
that acts first with probability that is equal to the golden ratio. We suggest the
notion of fragility as a measure for “fairness” of a game’s rules. Fragility counts
how many leaves’ payoffs should be flipped in order to convert the identity of
the winning player. Our main result provides a recursive formula for asymptotic
fragility of golden games. Surprisingly, golden games are extremely fragile. For
instance, with probability ≈ 0.77 a losing player could flip a single payoff (out
of 2n) and become a winner. With probability ≈ 0.999 a losing player could
flip 3 payoffs and become the winner.
1 Introduction
Random games are games where the payoffs to the players are realized in accordance
with a random process. In this paper we study a basic class of extensive form random
win-lose games, denoted Gn = Gn(p), over complete binary trees of depth n ∈ N0 with
∗urban031@gmail.com, partially supported by an Aly-Kaufman fellowship.
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alternating moves; the payoffs are drawn Bernoulli i.i.d. in each leaf, i.e. each leaf
has payoff “1” with probability p, and otherwise “0”. The players are called Player 1
and Player 2, and we use the convention that Player 2 makes the last move in the
game. In particular, Player 1 starts if the depth of the tree is even, and otherwise
Player 2 starts. The players observe the realization of Gn before playing it.1 Player 1
wins if the value of the game is “1” and otherwise Player 2 wins.
We focus on large random games when the depth n of Gn grows to infinity. Our
goal is to gain understanding for the following questions:
1. What is the asymptotic value (i.e., equilibrium outcome) of such a game?
2. Can such a simple random process generate an extensive form game that is
“hard to play” or repeatedly has “fair rules”?
We denote by ϕ =
√
5−1
2
the golden ratio. Regarding the first question we observe
in Proposition 1 the following: If p > ϕ, asymptotically, Player 1 wins the game with
probability 1. If p < ϕ, asymptotically Player 2, wins the game with probability 1.
For p = ϕ the value of the game remains uncertain (asymptotically) and the starting
player wins with probability ϕ (recall the starting player is Player 1 if and only
if the tree has even depth). Henceforth, we refer to random games with Bernoulli
parameter that is equal the golden ratio (p = ϕ) as golden games.
The second question requires more clarification in the interpretation of “hard to
play games” and “games with fair rules”. Regarding the notion of “hardness”, it is
problematic to apply the standard computational models since the input size of the
problem is of size 2n. Moreover, the input does not admit succinct representation.
Comparable to the input size 2n obviously a backward induction procedure deter-
mines the value and a winning strategy for the winner in 2n steps. Another standard
complexity model is the query complexity. Here, it is not hard to show exponential
hardness of golden games.
Regarding the notion of “fairness”, it is problematic to state that some win-lose
game is fair, because one player can guarantee winning. Nevertheless, it is reasonable
to study relaxed notions of “fairness” that either assume boundedly rational play or,
as we suggest, consider near-by games with very similar rules (payoffs) to argue that
a very similar game may flip the identity of the winning player.
We suggest a simple measure of game fragility to capture ‘fairness’ and ‘hardness’
in our specific scenario. Fragility relies on the notion of Hamming distance only. A
game can be viewed as an element of {0,1}2
n
. The set of binary-tree alternating-
move games can be partitioned into W1 ⊍W2, when Wi ⊂ {0,1}2
n
denotes the set of
1That is, the realization of Gn is an extensive-form complete-information zero-sum game.
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games where Player i wins. We define the fragility of a game G ∈ Wi (i.e., a game
where player i wins) to be the Hamming distance of G from the set Wj for j ≠ i.
Namely, how many payoffs shall the losing player switch in order to convert the value
of the game. Equivalently, a game is k-fragile if the losing player can flip k payoffs
to convert the value of the game in favor of him. Intuitively, a game is fragile if it
has a low ‘k-number’.
Our main result shows that golden games are surprisingly fragile. Table 1 presents
the probability of a golden game to be k-fragile for asymptotically large depth.
Table 1: Approximate limiting probability of d-fragility for golden games.
d 1 2 3 4 5
Pr[d-fragility] 0.773 0.972 0.999 1 − 5.57 × 10−5 1 − 6.98 × 10−7
We find the fact that the probability of 1-fragility is not asymptotically 0 quite
surprising. Recall that the number of leaves of Gn is 2n. In most cases, the losing
player can switch a single payoff to convert the value of the game in favour of him.
In other words, the probability that a golden game will be located precisely on the
boundary between W1 and W2 is ≈ 0.773. Moreover, one can see from Table 1
that the probability of d-fragility converges to 1 extremely fast. We also deduce a
theoretical statement that supports this statement; see Proposition 1. Our main
result (Theorem 5) is a recursive (in d) formula for the asymptotic probability of d-
fragility for golden games. We also show that fragility is unique for golden games; see
Proposition 8. Namely, for p ≠ ϕ, the asymptotic probability of a constant fragility
equals 0.
1.1 Related literature
Random games have been used to rationalize mixed Nash equilibria (Harsanyi [3]), to
study their generic properties in normal-form games, and as a tool to understand the
complexity of the set of Nash equilibria. Most literature on random games focuses
on normal form games and studies properties such as the expected number of Nash
equilibria [8, 9], the distribution of pure Nash equilibria [2, 11, 13, 10, 12, 15], or the
maximal number of equilibria [7].
Similar to our setting, [1] studies games over binary trees with alternating moves
where the payoff at the leaves are drawn i.i.d. according to some distribution; [1]
considers a more general scenario where payoff profiles are not necessarily zero-sum.
Unlike our setting, [1] consider continuous density distributions, whereas we focus
on the most fundamental setting of Bernoulli random payoffs that in particular are
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zero-sum. In this paper we go one step forward. We not only try to characterize
in which cases the equilibrium outcome of the game is certain or uncertain (i.e., the
probability of the value converges to a Dirac measure or assigns positive probability
to the two outcomes 0 and 1), but also we focus on the question how stable (or in
contrary fragile) is the value of the game.
Another remotely related line of literature is on the robustness of classifiers in
machine learning to errors in data. Szegedy et. al. [14] show that the state-of-art
classifiers are unstable to small adversarial perturbations in the data. This founding
has led to an extensive line of research in this direction. Our result is of similar spirit
in a different setting of extensive form games. In our terminology, the classifier is the
value of the game, and small perturbation is captured by flipping small number of
bits. Our result can be formulated as stating that the value of golden games is not
robust to adversarial perturbation of the game (this property is unique for golden
games). However, in our context this property is not necessarily interpreted as a
shortcoming.
Related games have also been studied in the context of the disjunctive sum opera-
tor in combinatorial game theory (CGT), discussed in various papers on scoring com-
binatorial games. In particular, “knotting-unknotting game” of Pechenik, Townsend,
Henrich, MacNaughton, and Silversmith [4] are binary games with 0-1 payoffs and
with constant parity of length of play. Observe that the popular CGT normal-play
convention is not immediately applicable here, but our model should be generalized
using guaranteed scoring combinatorial game theory [5, 6], in which the normal-play
convention is order embedded. Observe that in the CGT disjunctive sum model, the
order of play in distinct components is not necessarily alternating, so the setting in
this paper would require a vast generalization. Still our model invokes some questions
such as: is fragility related to winning by playing approximately optimal, i.e. if you
are not a perfect player, can you still win non-fragile games with high probability?
2 Model and main results
This paper, similarly to [1] focuses on random extensive form games. We consider
games on complete binary trees of depth n where moves are done in an alternating
manner, and the two players are Player 1 and Player 2. More concretely, we assume
that Player 2 acts last, i.e. Player 1 acts in all nodes of height 2m for 0 ≤ 2m ≤ n.
Correspondingly, Player 2 acts at all nodes of height 2m + 1 for 1 ≤ 2m + 1 ≤ n.
The 0/1 payoffs in the 2n leaves are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with prob-
ability of success p, with the standard convention that 1 indicates win of Player 1.
This random game is denoted by Gn = Gn(p) ∈ {0,1}2
n
, and the value of Gn is
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denoted by Vn = Vn(p) ∈ {0,1}, which in itself is a random variable. The fact that
we consider the value of the game, assumes that players observe the realization of
Gn(p) before playing it.
For the special case when p = ϕ =
√
5−1
2
≈ 0.618 is the golden section we call Gn a
golden game.
Our first result is a characterization of the asymptotic value of such a random
game as a function of p.
Proposition 1. Consider Gn(p), with p ∈ [0,1].
• For p > ϕ, then limn→∞Pr[Vn(p) = 1] = 1
• For p < ϕ, then limn→∞Pr[Vn(p) = 0] = 1
• For golden games, the starting player wins with probability ϕ, i.e. for all n ∈ N0,
Pr[V2n(ϕ) = 1] = Pr[V2n+1(ϕ) = 0)] = ϕ
Namely, the proposition states that for p above the golden ratio, Player 1 typically
wins such a random game. For p below the golden ratio, Player 2 typically wins such
a random game. For golden games the identity of the winner remains uncertain even
for large values of n; the probability of Player 1 being the winner depends only on
the parity of n.
Now we proceed to our main result on the fragility of golden games.
For i ∈ {1,2}, denote by W in ⊂ {0,1}(2
n) the set of all games Gn with value 2 − i
(i.e., those games where Player i wins).2
Definition 2. Let d ∈ N. A game Gn ∈ W in is d-fragile, denoted Gn ∈ F(d), if the
Hamming distance of Gn from the set W 3−in is at most d.3
Note that, for any p, Gn(p) is trivially 2n-fragile.
Definition 3. Let Fn(d) ∶= Pr[Gn(ϕ) ∈ F(d)] be the probability that a golden game
of depth n is d-fragile.
Example 4. The 1-fragility of the trivial game G0(ϕ) is F0(1) = 1, because if the
single payoff is 0 (probability ϕ) then Player 1 can win by flipping it, and if the
2This notion does not depend on that Gn is defined as a random game.
3Note that this definition does not use that Gn is a random game.
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single payoff is 1 (probability ϕ2), then Player 2 wins by flipping it. Further, the
probability of 1-fragility of G1(ϕ) is
F1(1) = ϕPr[G1 ∈ F(1) ∣ V1 = 0] +ϕ2Pr[G1 ∈ F(1) ∣ V1 = 1]
= ϕ(1 −Pr[G1 /∈ F(1) ∣ V1 = 0]) +ϕ2 ⋅ 1
= ϕ(1 − ϕ3) +ϕ2 = 1 − ϕ4 (1)
For example Pr[G1 /∈ F(1)] = ϕ4, and since we condition on that Player 2 wins G1,
according to Proposition 1 third item, the first term in (1) is correct.
Theorem 5. The asymptotic d-fragility of a golden game exists and it satisfies for
all d ∈ N,
lim
n→∞Fn(d) = 1 − ϕξd − ϕ
2ξ2d,
where ξd ∈ (0,1) is the smaller root of the second degree polynomial ϕ3H(d)−x+2ϕ2x2,
where H(1) = 1, and for d > 1,
H(d) = 1 − ∑
r+s=d
(1 − ξ2r)(1 − ξ
2
s) + ∑
r+s=d−1
(1 − ξ2r)(1 − ξ
2
s)
Remark 6. In fact, the proof of Theroem 5 provides more information about the
problem than just asymptotic fragility. It also provides precise answers for notions
as asymptotic fragility conditional on the identity of the winner, and conditional on
the parity of n. Moreover, recursive formulas as a function of the depth n (rather
than asymptotic) are deduced as well. For clarity of presentation we relegate these
additional insights to the proof.
Table 1 demonstrates the calculations of Theorem 5 for d ≤ 5. Although it can be
clearly seen from the table that the probability of d-fragility tends to 1 very quickly,
this statement requires a theoretical proof. Indeed we have the following proposition.
Proposition 7. We have limd→∞F (d) = 1.4
For p > ϕ, Player 1 typically wins a large random game; see Proposition 1. Are
these games fragile? The following proposition provides a negative answer to this
question.
We denote by Fn(d, p) ∶= Pr[Gn(p) is d-fragile] the probability of a random game
with Bernoulli parameter p (not necessarily a golden game) to be d-fragile.
4Note that this is a double-limit statement because F (d) in itself is an asymptotic probability.
If we convert the limits, the statement remains correct but trivial. Indeed for every fixed n, when
d → ∞ from sufficiently large d we have d ≥ 2n and obviously by flipping all payoffs the game in
favour of one player makes him win.
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Proposition 8. For every p ≠ ϕ and every fixed d we have limn→∞Fn(d, p) = 0.
This proposition stands in a sharp contrast to golden games where this limit
approaches 1 very quickly.
3 Proofs
In this section, we will restate the results and prove them. As before, let Gn = Gn(p)
denote an instance of the 2-player random game with starting position the root of a
binary tree of rank n, and with terminal positions the 2n leaves.
Proposition 1. Consider Gn(p), with p ∈ [0,1].
(i) For p > ϕ, then limn→∞Pr[Vn(p) = 1] = 1.
(ii) For p < ϕ, then limn→∞Pr[Vn(p) = 0] = 1.
(iii) For p = ϕ, the starting player wins with probability ϕ, i.e. for all n ∈ N0,
Pr[V2n(ϕ) = 1] = Pr[V2n+1(ϕ) = 0)] = ϕ.
Proof. We begin by proving item (i) and item (ii) is similar. Let g(x) denote the
probability that Player 2 wins G2(1 − x). Then g(x) = (1 − (1 − x)2)2, and note that
x is the probability that Player 2 wins G0(1 − x).
Similarly, if we let gn = g ○ gn−1, for all n > 0, then gn(x) is the probability that
Player 2 wins G2n(1 − x).
Consider any fixed 0 < δ < ϕ. We demonstrate that gn(ϕ2 + δ) is increasing.
Observe that g(x) = x4 − 4x3 + 4x2, so it suffices to show that x4 − 4x3 + 4x2 > x on
the open interval (ϕ2,1), that is that f(x) = x3 − 4x2 + 4x > 1. One can check that
f(1) = f(ϕ2) = 1, and that a local maximum is at x = 2/3, i.e f is increasing on
(ϕ2,2/3) and decreasing on (2/3,1), which settles this part.
Since g is increasing, it must converge, and we are interested in a number 1 ≥ γ =
limn gn(ϕ2 + δ). Namely, we want to show that γ = 1 if δ > 0. To this purpose, we
find all the fixed points of the equation x = (1 − (1 − x)2)2, that is x = 0 or we solve
the third degree equation 1 = 4x − 4x2 + x3, so that x = 1, x = 3−
√
5
2
or x = 3+
√
5
2
. The
third solution is too large, the second one will be too small, by 3−
√
5
2
= ϕ2 and δ > 0.
The first solution will be our fixed point γ = 1.
For item (iii), the base cases are Pr[V0 = 1] = ϕ, and Pr[V1 = 0] = 1 − ϕ2 = ϕ.
Namely player Player 2 cannot force a win of G1 if and only if each child of G1
has payoff “0”. By induction, we assume that Pr[Vn = 1] = ϕ if n is even. Then
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Pr[Vn+1 = 0] = 1−ϕ2 = ϕ, by the previous argument. And reversely, by induction, we
assume that Pr[Vn = 0] = ϕ if n is odd. Then Pr[Vn+1 = 1] = 1 − ϕ2 = ϕ.
The notion of fragility is conditioned on one of the player losing, and being able
to convert the value. In the proofs to come it turns out to be more convenient to
work with the reverse concept ‘robustness’, i.e. ‘you are winning and I am not able
to convert the value of the game’.
Definition 9. For a given fragility number d ∈ N, and any n ∈ N, let αn(d) = Pr[Gn /∈
F(d) ∣ Vn = 1] and βn(d) = Pr[Gn /∈ F(d) ∣ Vn = 0].
That is, the α sequence concerns the conditional probability of Player 2 losing,
and not being able to change the value of the game to a “0”, by flipping at most d
payoffs; the β sequence concerns the conditional probability of Player 1 losing, and
not being able of changing the value to a “1”, by flipping at most d payoffs.
For each fragility number d ∈ N, define functions z0, z1 ∶ N0 → R by
z0(d) = lim
n→∞(ϕ(1 − α2n(d)) + ϕ
2(1 − β2n(d))), (2)
and
z1(d) = lim
n→∞(ϕ
2(1 − α2n+1(d)) + ϕ(1 − β2n+1(d))), (3)
if the limits exist.
We will show that the limits exist, and that in fact z(d) = z0(d) = z1(d). Clearly,
if this holds, then z(d) equals the limiting probability that Gn(ϕ) is d-fragile, i.e.
F (d) = z(d) is the limiting probability that the losing player can win by flipping at
most d payoffs.
Thus, for each d, it suffices to find explicit values for limα2n(d) and limα2n+1(d)
to find F (d). We will show that these values exist and can be computed recursively
by using roots of quadratic equations derived from similar roots on smaller fragility
numbers.
First, we prove the main result (Theorem 5) for the case of 1-fragility. This helps
to outline the main ideas. Let GLn denote the game that starts with the left child of
Gn as root (where the payoffs remain the same), and let V Ln denote the game value
of GLn , and analogously for G
R
n . Thus G
L
n and G
R
n have depths n − 1. The fragility
of Gn naturally depends on the fragilities of GLn and G
R
n , with specified details as in
the below proofs.
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Proposition 10. The asymptotic probability of 1-fragility of a golden game exists
and it satisfies
F (1) = 1 −ϕξ − ϕ2ξ2
where ξ ∈ (0,1) is the smaller root of the second degree polynomial ϕ3 − x + 2ϕ2x2.
Moreover ξ = limα2n = limβ2n−1 ≈ 0.309017 and ξ2 = limα2n−1 = limβ2n ≈ 0.0954915.
Proof. Consider 1-fragility. Clearly α0 = β0 = 0 (conditioning on that the other player
wins the losing player can flip the single payoff and win), and we wish to prove that,
for all n > 0,
(i) α2n = ϕ3 + 2ϕ2α2n−1 and α2n−1 = α22n−2
(ii) β2n+1 = ϕ3 + 2ϕ2β2n and β2n = β22n−1
It suffices to prove (i), and (ii) is similar.
For Gi with i > 0, we condition on that Vi = 0, and motivate (i) by the equivalent
recurrences, α0 = 0 and for n > 0
α2n =
ϕ4 + 2ϕ3α2n−1
ϕ
(4)
and
α2n−1 =
ϕ2(α2n−2)2
ϕ2
(5)
Case i = 2n: In this case, since Player 1 starts, we prove that α2n is
Pr[G2n /∈ F(1) ∣ V2n = 1] =
Pr[Player 2 cannot change each child that has value 1]
Pr[V2n = 1]
By Proposition 1 (iii), Pr[V2n = 1] = ϕ, so the conditioning probability is correct.
The first term in the numerator of (4),
ϕ4 = Pr[V2n−1 = 1]2
corresponds to the probability (ϕ2)2 that both children GL
2n and G
R
2n have value 1
(again Proposition 1 (iii)), in which case the value of G2n, cannot be changed, since
d = 1; at most one payoff at leaf level can be flipped so at most one of V L
2n and V
R
2n
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can change, but since 2n is even, Player 1 starts, and thus can choose GL
2n or G
R
2n as
appropriate.
The second term in the numerator of (4) corresponds to the situation where ex-
actly one child has value 1, and we consider the probability that this child cannot
be changed (two ways). For this term, we use induction. Thus (4) is correct.
Case i = 2n − 1: In this case, since Player 2 is the starting player, α2n−1 is
Pr[G2n−1 /∈ F ∣ V2n−1 = 1] =
Pr[Player 2 cannot change one child]
Pr[V2n−1 = 1]
By Proposition 1, Pr[V2n−1 = 1] = ϕ2, so the conditioning probability is correct.
Moreover, the conditioning implies that both children have value 0, since Player 1
starts; i.e. V L
2n−1 = V
R
2n−1 = 1. Since the depth of the children is even, by Proposition 1,
this probability is ϕ2. By induction, the probability that neither child can be changed
is (α2n−2)2. Thus (5) is correct.
Finally, by induction α2n−2 ≤ ϕ implies that the sequence (α2n) is decreasing, and
thus (α2n−1) is also decreasing. Since (αi) is bounded below (by 0), the limits α2n
and α2n−1 exist, and thus F (1) = z(1), as in (3), is correctly defined, namely take
ξ = limα2n and ξ2 = limα2n−1, i.e. a(1) = 1 − ξ and b(1) = 1 − ξ2.
The generalization of this result, to d-fragility, relies on a counting argument
of pairs of 2-partitions of natural numbers. Again, without loss of generality (by
Proposition 1), in the proofs we will condition on that Player 2 loses.
The new case concerns G2n, n > 0. If both children have value 1, then Player 2
must change both to win a modified game; this is a special case of d-fragility, which
relies on a combinatorial counting argument. (In the below proof, we will letH(d,2n)
denote the probability that the value of at least one child of G2n cannot be changed,
that is, that such an instance of G2n is not d-fragile.)
Lemma 11. Fix any d ∈ N. Consider the set S = Sd of all ordered pairs (r, s),
with r + s = d. Now study the set R = Rd = {(x, y) ∣ x, y ∈ S,x ≠ y} of ordered
pairs of such ordered pairs, except the pairs of identical ordered pairs. Let T = Td =
{(min{x,u},min{y, v}) ∣ ((x, y), (u, v)) ∈ R}. Then T contains exactly all the pairs
(r,s), with 1 < r + s < d. Moreover ∣T ∣ = (d − 1)(d − 2)/2.
Proof. This is standard combinatorics.
We illustrate Lemma 11 with an example.
Example 12. Let d = 4. Then S = {(1,3), (3,1), (2,2)},
R = {{(1,3), (3,1)},{(2,2), (3,1)},{(2,2), (1,3)}}, and T = {(1,1), (1,2), (2,1)}.
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Let us explain the idea of how we use Lemma 11 in a game tree G of even depth.
If V L = V R = 0, then in case of fragility, Player 1 must flip a combination of (s, r)
payoffs, with s+r ≤ d, where 0 < s < d leaves belong to the the sub game tree GL, and
where 0 < r < d leaves belong to the sub game tree GR. For example, if d = 4 and G
is fragile with (r, s) = (1,2), then it is also fragile for (2,2) and (1,3). In the other
direction, if G is fragile for both (2,2) and (1,3) then it is also fragile for (1,2) (and
perhaps for (r, s) = (1,1)). In our special case of binary trees and 2-partitioning, by
Lemma 11, the inclusion-exclusion principle leads to a neat succinct description, as
stated in (6) below.
We restate the main theorem with some notation to be used in its proof.
Theorem 5. The asymptotic probability of d-fragility of a golden game F (d) satis-
fies, for all d ∈ N,
F (d) = 1 − ϕξd −ϕ2ξ2d
where ξd ∈ (0,1) is the smaller root of the second degree polynomial ϕ3H(d)−x+2ϕ2x2,
where H(1) = 1, and for d > 1
H(d) = 1 −C(d) +C(d − 1), (6)
where C(1) = 1, and for d > 1,
C(d) = ∑
r+s=d,0<r<d
(1 − ξ2r)(1 − ξ
2
s)
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 10; it remains to justify the factor
H(d) in (6), and argue that the x-sequence is decreasing for any d ≥ 1.
Consider d-fragility, and recall Definition 9. Clearly α0 = β0 = 0, and we wish to
prove that, for all n ≥ 0,
(i) α2n = ϕ3H(d,2n) + 2ϕ2α2n−1 and α2n−1 = α22n−2
(ii) β2n+1 = ϕ3H(d,2n + 1) + 2ϕ2β2n and β2n = β22n−1,
where, for all i ∈ N0,
H(d, i) = 1 −C(d, i) +C(d − 1, i), (7)
and where, for all i, H(1, i) = C(1, i) = 1, and otherwise
C(d, i) = ∑
r+s=d,0<r<d
(1 − ξ2r,i)(1 − ξ
2
s,i),
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where for all 0 < r < d, by induction αn,r satisfies the following recurrences; α0,r = 0
and for n > 0
α2n,r =
ϕ4H(r,2n) + 2ϕ3α2n−1,r
ϕ
(8)
and
αr,2n−1 =
ϕ2(αr,2n−2)2
ϕ2
(9)
As before, by symmetry, it suffices to study the cases where we condition on that
Player 2 loses, and thus we are concerned with the α sequence. Therefore, it suffices
to prove that limn→∞H(d,2n) = H(d) exists, and that indeed H(d,2n) counts the
probability of non-fragility for the case of two 1-valued children. Let us follow the
outline of the proof of the d = 1 case, and detail where the differences occur.
Case i = 2n (8): In this case, since Player 1 starts, α2n = αr,2n is
Pr[G2n /∈ F(d) ∣ V2n = 1] =
Pr[Player 2 cannot change each child that has value 1]
Pr[V2n = 1]
By Proposition 1 (iii), Pr[V2n = 1] = ϕ, so the conditioning probability is correct.
The first term in the numerator of (8),
ϕ4 = Pr[V L2n = V
R
2n = 1]
corresponds to the probability (ϕ2)2 that both children GL
2n and G
R
2n have value
1 (again Proposition 1 (iii)). Each term of C(d, i) defines the probability of GLi
r-fragile and GRi s-fragile. Here we use Lemma 11, to see that indeed H(d, i) is
correctly defined. Namely, the over counting of C(d, i) contains all terms C(r, i),
0 < r < d, but with alternating signs. When we subtract C(d−1, i) from C(d, i), then
all the smaller terms cancel, which proves the correctness of (7).
The second term in the numerator of (8) corresponds to the situation where
exactly one child has value 1, and this case is in direct analogy with the proof of
Proposition 1.
Finally, by induction α2n−2 ≤ ϕ and H(d,2n) trivially decreasing (the probability
that both children are fragile increases with increasing d) imply that the sequence
(α2n) is decreasing, and thus (α2n−1) is also decreasing. Since (αi) is bounded below
(by 0), the limits α2n and α2n−1 exist, and thus z is correctly defined (by using again
Proposition 1).
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Next we show that non-golden games are asymptotically ‘robust’, i.e. the prob-
ability of Gn(p) ∈ F tends to 0 for the p-Binomial distribution whenever p ≠ ϕ. It
suffices to study the case p > ϕ, by symmetry and Proposition 1.
Proposition 8. Consider p-Binomial distribution whenever p ≠ ϕ. For any given
d ∈ N, the probability of d-fragility tends to 0.
Proof. By symmetry, it suffices to study the case p > ϕ. By Proposition 1, Player 2
loses with asymptotic probability 1.
Proposition 1 implies that for any probability p′ < 1, and any fragility number
d there is a tree Gn(p), and a hight 2k < n, such that the probability is p′ that no
single node at hight 2k + 1, has value 1. The probability of d-fragility of the value
of such a game Gn is smaller than 1 − p′. Since p′ is arbitrary close to 1, the result
follows.
Proposition 7. The asymptotic probability of d-fragility satisfies limd→∞ F (d) = 1.
Proof. With notation as in Theorem 5, it suffices to prove that H(d)→ 0, as d→∞.
Clearly H(d)→ 0 if and only if ξd → 0. Hence, for a contradiction, suppose that there
is a 1 > δ > 0 such that ξd ↓ δ > 0, when d →∞ (monotonicity implying convergence
was already discussed in the proof of Theorem 5). H(d) is the asymptotic probability
that the losing player cannot change the value of each child, by flipping altogether
at most d payoffs.
Hence, for each (sufficiently small) ǫ > 0, there is a d such that
δ > ϕ3(1 − (1 − δ − ǫ)2) + 2ϕ2ξ2d (10)
≥ ϕ3H(d) + 2ϕ2ξ2d (11)
= ξd,
which contradicts the definition of δ. The inequality (10) follows since both children
cannot be changed, and by choosing d sufficiently large so that ξd is sufficiently close
to δ. Then inequality (11) follows by definition of H(d) for a sufficiently large d.
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